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INTRODUCTION
Health care is among the largest industries in the United
States. In 2019, approximately $3.8 trillion—17.7% of the country’s
Gross Domestic Product—was spent on healthcare services in the
United States.1 In 2020, despite a relatively slow year for the Federal
Government combating healthcare fraud and abuse, it won more than
$1.8 billion in healthcare fraud and abuse judgments and settlements.2
That same year the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) opened 1,148 new
criminal investigations for healthcare fraud and abuse and 1,079 civil
healthcare fraud investigations. 3 The DOJ has recovered over $62
billion through the False Claims Act (“FCA”) since Congress last
amended it in 1986.4 The government attempts to restrain and prevent
 J.D. candidate, December 2021, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; Master’s in Public Health & B.A. in Applied Psychology
from University of Illinois at Chicago. My utmost thanks to Professor Hal Morris,
Erin Monforti, and my classmates for their guidance on this article.
1
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE FACT SHEET, CENTS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID (2019), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet
(last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
2
Annual Report of Department of Health and Human Services and Justice,
HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM FY 2020 1 (2021),
https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY2020-hcfac.pdf.
3
Id.
4
Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2019, DEP’T OF JUSTICE. (Jan.9, 2020),
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fraud and abuse in health care by promulgating many statutes and
regulations with which healthcare companies must comply.
The FCA is the primary tool used to curb fraud and abuse in
health care.5 Fraud and abuse are perpetrated in health care in several
ways, such as by physicians prescribing unnecessary care for patients,
by medical and drug manufacturers paying kickbacks to physicians for
improperly prescribing their devices and drugs, or by health insurers
who submit reimbursements for health services to Medicaid or
Medicare that were never actually provided. 6 Since its inception,
Congress has amended the FCA several times increasing civil
penalties for fraud and abuse. 7 Congress significantly strengthened the
FCA in 19868, concurrent with the shift towards health managed
care—e.g. Preferred Provider Organizations, Health Maintenance
Organizations, and Medicare Advantage Plans.
Health managed care plans were invented to restrain healthcare
spending, increase the quality of health care, and reduce the fraud and
abuse prevalent in the traditional Fee-for-Service (“FFS”) model—
where physicians charge patients per service and insurance providers
reimburse per service. 9 In the context of fraud and abuse, the FFS
model has been highly criticized for encouraging physicians to
prescribe unnecessary medical tests or services to line their pockets;

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019.
5
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE FACT SHEET, supra note 1.
6
ALICE G. GOSFIELD & DANIEL F. SHAY, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD
AND ABUSE § 1:16 (18th ed. 2021).
7
Jacob J. Stephens, Dicta Me This: Implied False Certification to Materiality
Under the False Claims Act Post-Escobar, 44 U. Dayton L. Rev. 273, 278 (2019)
(“Congress amended the FCA in 1986 significantly increasing the amount in which
the relator was entitled to in recovery and increased the damages from double to
treble damages simultaneously raising the statutory penalty from $2,000 to between
$5,000 and $10,000 per false claim”).
8
Id.
9
GOSFIELD & SHAY, supra note 6 § 1:16.
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not to mention medical manufacturers or pharmaceutical companies
that may pay physicians kickbacks for sending patients their way. 10
In the last several decades, health care insurance plans have
shifted toward the managed care model that was created to decrease
the risk fraud and abuse prevalent under the FFS model while
providing improved, holistic health care to patients. 11 A Managed Care
Organization (“MCO”) is a health care plan or company that attempts
to focus on integrated care by linking patients with healthcare
providers who are incentivized to manage costs that were previously
inflated through the FFS model. 12 This model removes the negative
incentives that exist in the FFS model because physicians and MCOs
are not encouraged to supply more care than is necessary for the
patient, thus, the government is less likely to be charged for care that
patients do not require.13 MCOs are discouraged from overprescribing
medical care through conditioning payments for healthcare services
based on prearranged capitated amounts for patients rather than getting
reimbursed per service—essentially the MCOs bear the risk of
underpayment because capitation rates are fixed. 14
Capitation rates are the most common mechanism by which the
government pays MCOs.15 Capitation rates are calculated using
actuarily sound methods based on beneficiaries’ health characteristics
that make them more or less likely to require certain healthcare

10
Id; see also Sharon L. Davies & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care:
Placebo or Wonder Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse?, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 373,
379 (1997).
11
How do ACOs vs. MCOs Compare and Contrast?, GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIV. SCH. OF BUS., (Mar. 3, 2021) https://healthcaremba.gwu.edu/blog/how-doacos-and-mcos-compare-and-contrast/.
12
Id.
13
GOSFIELD & SHAY, supra note 6 §1:16.
14
Id.; see also Joseph Heaton & Prasanna Tadi, Managed Care Organization.
(Mar. 6, 2021) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK557797/.
15
A Primer on Medicaid Managed Care Capitation Rates: Understanding How
MassHealth Pays MCOs, MASS. MEDICAID POLICY INST., 1 (Oct. 2015)
https://www.bluecrossmafoundation.org/sites/g/files/csphws2101/files/202010/MMPI%20Primer%20on%20MCO%20Capitation%20Rates.pdf.
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services.16 Once beneficiaries are placed in the tier suited to their
health characteristics, they receive access to any of the healthcare
services outlined in their respective package (or tier). These types of
MCO agreements with the government using capitation rates are
termed “assumption of risk contracts” because the MCOs bear the risk
of providing care to patients regardless of whether the fixed capitated
amount covers the patient’s care. 17 Conversely, if the beneficiaries do
not utilize enough health services to max out the capitated amount
allotted for their care, the MCO keeps the remaining funds.18 Fraud
and abuse can be perpetrated in these agreements if too many
beneficiaries are enrolled into a package that does not have enough
resources, by placing beneficiaries in the wrong tier to save costs, or
by denying beneficiaries care they are eligible to receive. 19
Several courts have grappled with applying the FCA to MCOs
with fixed capitation rates for enrolled beneficiaries. The Supreme
Court tackled this issue most recently in Universal Health Services,
Inc. v. United States and Massachusetts, ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa (“Escobar”), when it interpreted the FCA to include
an implied false certification theory of liability. 20 The implied false
certification theory provides a basis for liability by stating that an
organization’s submission for reimbursement implies that the
organization met its obligations to the government when in reality the
organization omitted some fact that renders the submission
misleading.21 Under the implied false certification theory, omissions
become false claims only if they are material to the agreement the
16

Patrick C. Alguire, Understanding Capitation, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS,
https://www.acponline.org/about-acp/about-internal-medicine/careerpaths/residency-career-counseling/guidance/understanding-capitation (Dec. 3, 2021).
17
A Primer on Medicaid Managed Care Capitation Rates: Understanding How
MassHealth Pays MCOs, supra note 15.
18
Id.
19
GOSFIELD & SHAY, supra note 6 §1:16.
20
579 U.S. 176, 177 (2016).
21
Id at 181. (Clarifying that the FCA implied false certification theory can
provide the basis for liability when the defendant submits a claim “for payment that
makes specific recommendations about the goods or services provided” and that
“liability may attach if the omission renders those representations misleading”).
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organization has with the government. 22 Proving liability under this
theory requires greater evidence than an organization’s mere noncompliance with a “particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirement as a condition of payment.”23 The Supreme Court in
Escobar outlined two conditions that must be satisfied to find liability
under this theory: “first, the claim does not merely request payment,
but also makes specific representations about the goods or services
provided; and second, the defendant's failure to disclose
noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.”24
While Escobar expanded the FCA to include the implied false
certification theory of liability, it did not alter the materiality
element.25 Escobar cited both common law standards of materiality
and the statutory definition.26 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
defines materiality as a misrepresentation likely to induce a reasonable
person, or the government, to “manifest his assent” to payments. 27 The
FCA defines materiality as “having a natural tendency to influence, or
be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or
property.”28 Justice Thomas’s dictum in Escobar described several
examples of evidence to show materiality at the pleading stage.
However, the Seventh Circuit took it upon itself to lessen the
claimant’s burden to show materiality at the pleading stage by

22

Id. at 181.
Id. at 194.
24
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 176, 188 (emphasis added).
25
Id. at 193. See also Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot to
Foreign Staplers Has the Supreme Court's Materiality Standard Under Escobar
Provided Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the False Claims
Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (2018).
26
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 193.
27
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162(2), and Comment c, pp.
439, 441 (1979)).
28
31 USCA § 3729(b)(2)(B)(4).
23
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expanding the type of evidence appropriate to meet this burden under
the implied false certification theory. 29
In United States ex rel. Prose v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois,
Inc. (“Prose”), the Seventh Circuit held that materiality is met where
the MCO is a “highly sophisticated member of the medical-services
industry.”30 This holding requires an MCO to know whether an
omission of non-compliance with a “particular statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirement”31 is material to the government's contract
purely by the MCO’s membership in the health care industry—
essentially the MCO must guess what is material to the government.
The Seventh Circuit loosening the materiality element is contrary to
Justice Thomas’ dictum in Escobar describing how materiality is to be
interpreted under the implied false certification theory.32 In
disregarding the examples Justice Thomas laid out in Escobar—which
lower courts have ascribed to since—the Seventh Circuit lessens the
materiality burden at the pleading stage for claimants which will
inevitably lead to frivolous FCA litigation. The FCA has a heightened
pleading standard for a reason, to prevent the statute from being used
as a tool for enforcing breaches of contractual obligations or
compliance violations, rather its purpose is to prevent fraudsters from
getting the government to pay false claims. 33
This article examines how the Prose majority’s
implementation of materiality under the FCA’s implied false
certification theory deviates from the Supreme Court’s guidance in
Escobar. By interpreting an MCO's membership in the medical
services industry as evidence that the MCO knew the materiality of a
specific contract provision, the Seventh Circuit renders the materiality
element toothless and ignores the complexity of issues with which
MCOs grapple. This article first discusses the history of MCOs in the
context of healthcare fraud and abuse, including the multitude of
29
See U.S ex rel. Prose v. Molina Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 10 F.4th 765, 770 (7th
Cir. 2021).
30
Id.
31
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 194.
32
Id. at 195.
33
United States ex rel. Prose, Inc., 10 F.4th at 772.
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governing statutes and regulations demanding MCO compliance. The
discussion then turns to an analysis of Prose in the context of Escobar
and post-Escobar case law. Finally, this article addresses the
continued controversy surrounding the post-Escobar evidentiary
theories of materiality under the implied false certification theory and
the future impact on MCOs facing FCA claims.
BACKGROUND
A. History of Health Managed Care Organizations
Managed healthcare plans are by no means a new concept. In
fact, the first managed healthcare plan in the United States dates back
to 1929 in a small Oklahoma farm community. 34 During the Nixon
Administration, Congress enacted the Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973 to restrain national healthcare spending
while encouraging competition in healthcare markets.35 In the 1990s,
commercially managed healthcare plans began to take off, especially
employer-based managed care plans. 36 In 1996, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act established a funds program, which
uses funds collected through health fraud and abuse investigations to
combat fraud in both public and private health plans.37 Today over
69% of Medicaid38 and approximately 75% of privately insured39
beneficiaries are enrolled in managed healthcare plans.

A Brief History of Managed Care. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (2015,
July 30) https://www.ncd.gov/policy/appendix-b-brief-history-managed-care.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
978. Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program and Guidelines. DEP’T
OF JUST. ARCHIVES. (Jan. 21, 2020) [https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminalresource-manual-978-health-care-fraud-and-abuse-control-program-andguidelines#intro#intro. [Check Rule 18.2.1(d) for how to cite archival doc].
38
Elizabeth Hinton & Marybeth Musumeci, Medicaid Managed Care Rates
and Flexibilities: State Options to Respond to COVID-19 Pandemic, KFF (Sept. 9,
2020) https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-managed-care-rates-andflexibilities-state-options-to-respond-to-covid-19-pandemic/.
34
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Since the 1980s, private health plans have increasingly shifted
to managed care.40 Managed care covers many forms of financial
arrangements for providing health care in ways meant to control
healthcare costs.41 Healthcare costs are reduced in managed care
through adjusting insurance and medical providers’ behaviors under
best practice clinical standards, introducing financial incentives to
limit medical costs, and integrating care delivery practices for
beneficiaries.42 Capitated MCOs are now the dominant way for states
to deliver Medicaid services to beneficiaries. 43 While the jury is out on
how well MCOs restrain healthcare spending, several early studies
conducted by economists at the National Bureau of Economic
Research found that MCOs have been successful in decreasing
healthcare spending.44 For example, one study found private MCOs
can reduce spending because for every 10% increase in beneficiary
enrollment, health spending was reduced by 0.5% per year; another
study found hospital costs went down per admission because MCO
beneficiaries had shorter lengths of stay, and a third study found
requirements that MCOs update healthcare providers clinical practice
standards restrained traditional FFS expenditures. 45
In the 1990s, several legal scholars considered how this new
model for providing health care could reduce fraud and abuse.46 The
traditional FFS model fosters fraud and abuse through providers who
encourage patient overutilization of healthcare services, induce
39
Managed Care Has Slowed Growth in Medical Spending. National Bureau of
Economic Research. (May 1998) https://www.nber.org/digest/may98/managed-carehas-slowed-growth-medical-spending.
40
Id.
41
Davies & Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 10, at 379.
42
Id.
43
Hinton & Musumeci, supra note 38.
44
Managed Care Has Slowed Growth in Medical Spending, supra note 39.
45
Id.
46
Gail B. Agrawal, Fraud and Abuse in an Era of Managed Care, AHLAPAPERS (Jun. 28, 1998) (arguing that while fraud and abuse still exist under MCOs,
MCOs are more incentivized by both contractual and legal obligations to detect and
prevent abusive and fraudulent practices within their organizations as compared to
the traditional FFS model). See also Davies & Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 10.

176

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/8

8

McGrenera: Give an Inch, Take a Mile: The Seventh Circuit Extends Escobar's

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

physician referrals for kickbacks, and submit false claims for services
that were not rendered—essentially allowing providers to earn more
pay for unnecessary or sometimes non-existent health care rather than
quality health care.47 Although MCOs were created to obviate
traditional forms of fraud and abuse pervasive in the FFS model,
critics readily pointed out the many ways in which MCOs can still
commit fraud and abuse.48
The MCO model engenders opportunities for fraud and abuse,
such as underutilizing medically necessary services, enrolling too
many beneficiaries in an MCO plan, and providing lower-quality
healthcare to retain unused funds.49 Thus, several statutes and
regulations have been enacted to curb the potential for fraud and abuse
in MCOs.50 Despite skepticism as to how successful the MCO model
would be in limiting healthcare fraud and abuse, over thirty-nine states
have now adopted MCOs as the major delivery system for their
Medicaid programs.51 MCOs have become so popular in the last few
decades because MCOs can provide care that the FFS model does

47

James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health
Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 205
(1996).
48
Davies & Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 10, at 395 (arguing that fraud and abuse
are persistent in the managed care context but it’s much harder to detect
underutilization of health services and poor-quality health services are more difficult
to prove).
49
Paul R. DaMuro, Fraud and Abuse By and Against HMOs and Other MCOs,
AHLA-PAPERS (Oct. 2, 1996). See also Davies & Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 10, at
393.
50
901. Scope of the General Statutes Prohibiting Fraud Against the
Government, DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES. (January 21, 2020)
[https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-901-scope-generalstatutes-prohibiting-fraud-against-government] (the Health Care Fraud and Abuse
Control Program outlines the many federal, state, and local law enforcement
mechanisms for combating healthcare fraud and abuse and is enumerated further in
subsection C of this comment).
51
Illinois’ Massive Shift to Managed Care, ILL. COMPTROLLER 3 (May 2019)
https://illinoiscomptroller.gov/news/fiscal-focus/illinois-massive-shift-to-managedcare/.
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not.52 They do not pay providers per service but offer bundled services
that may include preventative services, disease management, and care
coordination (i.e., networks of doctors, specialists, and hospitals) to
increase beneficiaries’ healthcare options. 53 As MCOs have become
ever more popular due to their success in reducing healthcare
spending, they have also been increasingly subject to compliance and
regulatory restrictions.
B. Managed Care Organizations in Illinois: A Case Study
Approximately thirty-two states have enacted their versions of
the FCA.54 The Illinois FCA essentially mirrors the federal FCA.55
The Illinois Department of Human Services (“IDHS”) defines MCOs
as “healthcare provider[s] that provide[] services for a set monthly
fee.”56 IDHS goes on to describe MCOs as Health Managed Care
Organizations (“HMOs”) and Managed Care Community Networks
(“MCCNs”), both risk-bearing entities—meaning they assume the risk
of underpayment characteristic of MCOs.57 Despite its late start in
adopting MCOs in the 2010s, Illinois is now one of the twenty-eight
states that have at least 80% of their Medicaid programs delivered
through MCOs.58 Illinois MCO legislation activities began in earnest

52

Robert Book, Benefits and Challenges of Medicaid Managed Care, FORBES
(Oct. 19, 2012) https://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/10/18/benefits-andchallenges-of-medicaid-managed-care/?sh=7e628ea7720f.
53
Book, supra note 52. See also Gaby Roman, What is "Managed care," and
how is it working for Illinois' Medicaid program?, CTR. FOR TAX AND BUDGET
ACCOUNTABILITY, (April 22, 2019) https://budgetblog.ctbaonline.org/what-ismanaged-care-and-how-is-it-working-for-illinois-medicaid-program-e5229a9ef2dc.
54
States False Claims Act, PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK &
RASPANTI, LLP, (Last visited November 9, 2021)
https://www.falseclaimsact.com/states-municipalities-fcas/.
55
See generally Illinois False Claims Act, 740 ILCS 175/1, et seq.
56
Policy Manual 20-24-00: Managed Care Organization (MCO). IDHS. (2020)
https://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=18089.
57
Id.
58
Illinois’ Massive Shift to Managed Care, supra note 51 at 3 (as of 2018,
thirty-nine states utilize MCOs for at least part of their Medicaid Programs, twenty-
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in 2011 with the goals of increasing efficiency through healthcare
coordination and cutting down on waste. 59 In 2012, the Illinois
legislature passed the Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together
(“SMART”) Act which increased cost-sharing measures, stringent
monitoring standards for MCOs, and an beneficiary eligibility system
to accommodate the Affordable Care Act. 60
In 2019, the Illinois Comptroller, along with other critics,
expressed concerns that relying on private MCOs decreases
transparency and leads to less government control over the MCOs.61
Much of the criticism of MCOs concerns the lack of data collected
about MCO patient care delivery and the fear that MCOs save money
at the expense of denying care to patients in need. 62 The Illinois
Hospital Association, along with other organizations and politicians,
has successfully lobbied for renewed transparency and data collection
activities required of Illinois MCOs.63 MCOs are still the preferred
method for managing Illinois Medicaid and Medicare programs, thus
these reforms are vital to assess MCO success at providing improved
patient care while saving the state money. MCOs are responsible for
adhering to these new state regulations in addition to a multitude of
federal statutes and regulations. Illinois’ reliance on private MCOs
illustrates both the high potential for fraud and abuse and the need for
transparent fraud and abuse laws so that MCOs may ensure their
compliance.
eight of which, including Illinois, have 80% of their Medicaid systems under
MOCs).
59
Id. at 5.
60
Id. at 6.
61
Id.
62
Illinois’ Massive Shift to Managed Care, supra note 51 at 8. See also Roman,
supra note 43. These criticisms can be viewed with some skepticism as they came in
the wake of the state’s recovery from a two-year budget standoff between political
parties which caused the state to stop paying private MCOs capitated payments for
Medicaid beneficiaries which could explain some of their denials for beneficiaries.
63
Illinois’ Massive Shift to Managed Care, supra note 51; see also IHA
Summary: Medicaid Managed Care and Prior Authorization Reform Bill, ILL.
HEALTH AND HOSP. ASS’N, (July 6, 2021) https://www.team-iha.org/files/nongated/advocacy/managed-care-bills-memo-07-06-2021.aspx?ext=.pdf.
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C. Current Laws and Regulations Governing Managed Care
Organizations
Many mechanisms exist for policing MCOs in federal, state,
and local laws and regulations. MCOs potential for fraud and abuse is
closely monitored by state and federal government agencies plus
private citizens who can bring FCA claims on behalf of the
government. The major mechanism for controlling fraud and abuse in
healthcare was created through the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) of 1996.64 HIPAA established the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program to combat fraud and
abuse committed against all health plans.65 Congress has enumerated
many statutes to combat all types of fraud and abuse against the
government, which fall under five general categories: false claims,
conspiracy, false statements, mail fraud, and wire fraud.66 The most
pertinent statute for fraud and abuse in the healthcare industry is the
False Claims Act. The FCA, originally enacted during the Civil War,
is now integral in policing healthcare fraud and abuse.67
The FCA penalizes presenters of false claims for payment or
approval against the government.68 FCA violations can result in hefty
civil penalties for healthcare organizations. 69 Civil penalties for false
claims are hefty, charging no less than $5,000 and no more than
64
978. Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program and Guidelines, supra
note 37.
65
Id. The program provides many enforcement mechanisms through the
coordination of various federal agencies, state regulators, and criminal and civil
penalties for violators. Enforcement objectives are supported by required audits,
investigations, and evaluations of the delivery and payment of healthcare services to
MCOs.
66
901. Scope of the General Statutes Prohibiting Fraud Against the
Government, supra note 50.
67
See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 176, 181 (2016).
68
901. Scope of the General Statutes Prohibiting Fraud Against the
Government, supra note 50.
69
31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G).

180

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/8

12

McGrenera: Give an Inch, Take a Mile: The Seventh Circuit Extends Escobar's

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

$10,000 per false claim, plus up to three times the amount of damages
the government sustains because of such claims. 70 Several federal
agencies are responsible for combating healthcare fraud and abuse and
do so by implementing regulations for health care organization
compliance. The DOJ is responsible for enforcing criminal fraud and
abuse provisions through investigating and bringing FCA claims
against health care organizations.71 The Office of Inspector General
together with the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)
are charged with investigating and mitigating fraud and abuse in
Medicaid and Medicare programs specifically. 72 The FCA also creates
a right of action by which private parties, called relators, can bring an
FCA claim against healthcare providers or MCOs on behalf of the
government in what is known as a qui tam lawsuit.73
In addition to federal and state statutes which govern fraud and
abuse claims, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) also executes regulations and penalties on MCOs that
contract with the government. 74 The ultimate penalty that CMS exacts
is exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid for at least
five years.75 CMS may impose civil liability for deficiencies in MCOs
that have adverse effects or have a substantial likelihood of adversely
affecting beneficiaries’ care. 76 For example, an MCO could enroll
more beneficiaries than it has the resources to provide for, thus failing
to provide proper services to its existing beneficiaries. Compliance
70

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
978. Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program and Guidelines, supra
note 37.
72
Id.
73
31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c) (in “qui tam” lawsuits relators are entitled to a
percentage of any judgments or settlements awarded to the government in a qui tam
lawsuit).
74
GOSFIELD & SHAY, supra note 6, § 1:3.
75
Davies & Stoltzfus Jost, supra note 10 at 377 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a7(a)-(c)).
76
GOSFIELD & SHAY, supra note 6, § 1:3 (CMS also imposes civil penalties of
$25,000 for deficiencies that adversely affect or have a substantial likelihood of
adversely affecting beneficiaries’ health care and may impose up to $100,000 for
deficiencies that remain uncorrected).
71
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programs are another major requirement CMS imposes on MCOs to
help prevent fraud and abuse. 77 The collective force of all these
agencies' efforts to prevent and investigate potential fraud and abuse
leads to a veritable minefield of compliance obligations for MCOs. As
a result, MCOs are often faced with balancing compliance priorities.
Clarity is essential in compliance requirements for MCOs to avoid
facing fraud and abuse claims.
D. Legal Landscape of the False Claims Act
The FCA was enacted by Congress at the height of the Civil
War in response to dishonest vendors who were defrauding the
government through the sale of defective, worthless, and nonexistent
goods.78 Today the FCA remains focused on actors who “present or
directly induce the submission of false or fraudulent claims” to the
government.79 The FCA imposes civil liability on anyone who
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval” to the government.80 To prove a claim
under the FCA the following four elements must be satisfied: “(1) the
defendant made a statement to receive money from the government;
(2) the statement was false; (3) the defendant knew that the statement
was false; and (4) the false statement was material to the government's
decision to pay or approve the false claim.”81
77

GOSFIELD & SHAY, supra note 6, § 1:16.
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 176, 181 (2016); see also Stephens, supra note
7, at 276.
79
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
80
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)–(b). The FCA defines the following relevant terms:
“claim” as including direct requests for payment or reimbursement from the
government made by recipients of federal funds; “material” as “having a natural
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money
or property”; and “knowing” and “knowingly” as anyone with “actual knowledge of
the information.”
81
United States ex rel. Nedza v. Am. Imaging Mgmt., Inc., No. 15 C 6937,
2019 WL 1426013, at 5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2019). See Part I of this comment for a
discussion of the theories of liability under the FCA.
78
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Arguably, the most difficult element for claimants to meet,
particularly at the pleading stage, is the materiality requirement. 82
Under the statute, material “means having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
money or property.”83 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states a
“misrepresentation is material” only if it would “‘likely . . . induce a
reasonable person to manifest his assent,’ or the defendant ‘knows that
for some special reason [the representation] is likely to induce the
particular recipient to manifest his assent’ to the transaction.”84 At the
pleading stage, the FCA has a heightened pleading requirement under
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that
the party alleging fraud or mistake “must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” 85 The reason behind the
heightened pleading standard for FCA claims is to weed out those
claims that are more appropriately brought as a breach of contract
action or failure to comply with other statutes or regulations rather
than actual attempts at defrauding the government. 86
The two main theories of liability under the FCA are “express
certification” and “implied certification.” 87 Like their names indicate,
“express certification” theory describes those claims based on actual
false statements made to the government, whereas “implied
certification” occurs when an actor seeks payment from the
government without disclosing any violations it made which affect its
eligibility for payment.88 Until the Supreme Court's decision in
Escobar in 2016, a circuit split existed as to whether the theory of

82

See Stephens, supra note 7, at 275.
31 USCA § 3729(b)(4).
84
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 188 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538).
85
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (although the rule clarifies that the scienter requirement
may be alleged generally).
86
Morgan Gray, Loosen Up: Breaking Free from Strict “With Particularity”
Requirements When Pleading Fraud for Qui Tam Actions Brought Under the FCA,
49 Creighton L. Rev. 415, 416 (Mar. 2016).
87
ROBERT JOHN KANE, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS, § 18:5
(3d ed. 2021).
88
Id.
83
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implied false certification was actionable under the FCA.89 The
circuits were in disagreement on whether to accept the implied false
certification theory in whole, in part, or at all. 90
Prior to Escobar, three competing theories on how implied
false certifications could be the basis of liability existed: (1) when it
violated an express condition of payment; (2) that it should be applied
broadly to any omissions; or, (3) that it should never be the basis of
liability.91 This third perspective was articulated by the Fifth, Eighth,
and Seventh Circuits who chose not to allow the implied false
certification theory.92 The Seventh Circuit's view before Escobar was
that the theory should not be recognized because it is overbroad,
granting claimants the ability to use the FCA as a sort of strict liability
statute for any failures by organizations to meet all regulatory,
statutory, or contractual obligations. 93
ESCOBAR RECOGNIZED THE IMPLIED FALSE CERTIFICATION
THEORY OF LIABILITY
The Supreme Court settled the circuit split on the implied false
certification theory with its holding in Escobar.94 Justice Thomas,
writing on behalf of the majority, stated that “the implied false
certification theory can be a basis for liability.” 95 The FCA claim arose
in Escobar because a counseling center submitted claims for
89

Stephens, supra note 7, at 275.
Id.
91
Doan Phan, Redefining Lincoln's Law: How to Shape the Theory of Implied
Certifications Post-Escobar, 13 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 113, 120 (2017).
92
See U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir.
2010); see also United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711 (7th Cir.
2015) (holding “we join the Eighth Circuit and hold that FCA liability is not
triggered by an institution's failure to comply . . .” to a standard regulation unless the
relator proves that the standard to show initial compliance with the regulation was
false).
93
Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d at 711 (7th Cir. 2015).
94
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 176, 181 (2016).
95
Id.
90
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reimbursement to Medicaid for its specific services (e.g., family
therapy, individual therapy, etc.) that were being provided by
unlicensed, uneducated personnel. 96 The case arose after a teenage
beneficiary of Massachusetts's Medicaid program received healthcare
services from Arbour Counseling Services where she was a patient of
five different medical professionals who diagnosed, treated, and
prescribed her medications. 97 Over time her condition worsened and,
eventually, she had a seizure and died. 98 Upon her death, her mother
and stepfather were told by an Arbour employee that 23 of the
employees—several of whom treated their daughter—did not have the
proper education and licensing required to perform these medical
practices.99 The Court found that the representations made by the
counseling center in its submissions for payment reimbursement for
patient services were impliedly false because the staff conducting the
services were not licensed to perform them. 100 The Court dismissed
the theory that only express or affirmative falsehoods violate the FCA
because that interpretation excludes omissions that can amount to
fraudulent misrepresentations. 101
The Court clarified under what circumstances the implied false
certification theory is applicable: “(1) the claim does not merely
request payment, but also makes specific representations about the
goods or services provided; and (2) the defendant's failure to disclose
noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.”102
The alleged falsity in the claim is not limited to contractual provisions
which are conditions of payment but can be based on any noncompliance with contractual, regulatory, or statutory provisions of the
contract as long as the claim itself meets the two circumstances
96

Id. at 183.
Id.
98
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 184.
99
Id. at 184–85.
100
Id. at 189.
101
Id. at 187; see also United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696,
711-12 (7th Cir. 2015).
102
Id. at 190.
97
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above.103 In cases of omissions, this theory of liability attaches if the
same circumstances apply to make the omissions misleading. 104
The Supreme Court reiterated that the materiality element must
still be met when it wrote, any false claims based on omissions of
noncompliance “must be material to the Government’s payment
decision in order to be actionable” under the FCA. 105 The Court
articulated the standard that FCA claimants must show the alleged
non-compliance was material to the government’s decision to pay
reimbursements, even at the pleading stage, because health care
entities are subject to “thousands of complex statutory and regulatory
provisions” and “facing [FCA] liability for violating any of them
would hardly help would-be defendants anticipate and prioritize
compliance obligations."106 Thus, the Court insisted that “not every
undisclosed violation of an express condition of payment
automatically triggers liability.”107
Escobar demonstrates that materiality is no small obstacle at
the pleading stage. The claimants must show that the alleged noncompliance—which led to the implied false certification—was
material to the government’s decision to pay reimbursements and that
the defendant knew the noncompliance was material. 108 Although
knowledge at the pleading stage can be alleged generally, the facts
pled must still state particular facts to show materiality.109 The Court
concluded that because proper medical licensing was a condition of
payment for participation in Medicaid and Medicare—which the
counseling center knew—there was no way the government would
have continued to reimburse the counseling centers payments for
providing medical care by unlicensed and uneducated personnel.110

103

Escobar, 579 U.S. at 190.
Id. at 187–88.
105
Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 190.
108
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 194–95.
109
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
110
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 196.
104

186

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/8

18

McGrenera: Give an Inch, Take a Mile: The Seventh Circuit Extends Escobar's

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

The Court’s discussion of the potential difficulty in proving
materiality under the implied false certification theory demonstrates
that the materiality element is just as demanding under this theory as
ever.111 While the materiality element is no less exacting under this
theory of liability, Justice Thomas on behalf of the majority described
several factors plaintiffs may use to demonstrate the materiality of the
alleged noncompliance, including:
[E]vidence that the defendant knows that the
Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the
mine run of cases based on noncompliance with the
particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays a
particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that
certain requirements were violated, that is very strong
evidence that those requirements are not material. Or, if
the Government regularly pays a particular type of
claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain
requirements were violated, and has signaled no change
in position, that is strong evidence that the requirements
are not material.112
In several ways, Escobar put an end to confusion and
disagreements in the circuits regarding how the implied false
certification theory creates liability under the FCA. However, Justice
Thomas's dictum on what factors tend to show materiality has led to a
new circuit split about how much weight should be given to these
factors as evidence of materiality.
A. The Circuit Split Post-Escobar
111

Samantha L. Groden & Talia Linneman, Escobar Two Years Out: How
Courts Have Interpreted the Escobar Materiality Standard and Implications for
Assessing Potential Overpayments, J. Health Care Compliance 45, 46 (2018); see
also Stephens, supra note 7 (arguing that despite differing interpretations of what
types of evidence of materiality is most dispositive by different circuits, that the
Supreme Court did not intend to lessen to any extent the materiality and scienter
requirements).
112
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 195.

187

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

19

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

Since Escobar, courts have grappled with applying the
materiality element under the now-recognized implied false
certification theory of liability. Three theories of what type of
evidence shows an organization’s noncompliance with a statutory,
regulatory, or contractual obligation is material to its agreement with
the government have emerged post-Escobar.113 The first theory is that
evidence showing the noncompliance must go to the “very essence of
the bargain” between the organization and the government to be
material.114 The next theory is that evidence showing the
noncompliance was more technical to the specific agreement between
the organization and government is less likely to be material.115 The
third theory is that evidence of the government’s payment history,
regardless of an organization’s noncompliance with its agreement with
the government, requires a heightened showing of proof to be
material.116
I. Essence of the Bargain Theory
Based on its interpretation of the implied false certification
theory, the Supreme Court vacated the First Circuit’s judgment in
Escobar and remanded it back to the appellate court for
reconsideration.117 The First Circuit on remand in Escobar II
interpreted the Supreme Court’s opinion about materiality to mean
“materiality is more likely be found where the information at issue
goes to the very essence of the bargain.” 118 Several circuits and district
courts followed in the First Circuit's footsteps, essentially looking at
whether the alleged misrepresentation to the government goes to the
essence of the bargain to determine its materiality. 119 Two primary
113

Groden & Linneman, supra note 111 at 47.
Id. (citing United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Services, Inc.
(Escobar II), 842 F.3d 103, 110 (5th Cir. 2016).
115
Groden & Linneman, supra note 111 at 48.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 47.
118
Escobar II, 842 F.3d at 110.
119
Groden & Linneman, supra note 111, at 46.
114
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examples of when courts have determined that misrepresentations go
to the essence of the bargain are regulatory requirements that relate to
quality-of-care standards and medical necessity, as opposed to purely
contractual requirements that are “more technical in nature.” 120 The
logic behind these examples is plain because the government’s
primary concerns are that the quality of care patients receive meets the
appropriate standards and that beneficiaries should be receiving
medically necessary care. 121 For example, the First Circuit in Escobar
II held that the unlicensed staff providing therapy to patients impaired
the quality of care for patients which went to the essence of the
bargain with the government—to provide quality therapy to
government beneficiaries.122
Similarly, in U.S. ex rel. Emanuele v. Medicor Associates, the
Western District of Pennsylvania found when the defendants failed to
report in writing their Stark Act violations to the government, the
omission went to the essence of the bargain because this reporting was
required under both the contract and CMS rules. 123 The hefty
penalties and criminal charges associated with Stark Act violations
make the government’s stance abundantly clear to providers that they
will not condone such activities. 124
In United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., the Central
District of California held that a drug company’s submission of
reimbursement claims to CMS for prescribed drugs that were not
covered under Medicare Part D was material under the FCA. 125 In
Celgane, the drug manufacturer only had approval for the drug to treat
specific forms of cancer, but it ran an off-label campaign that
120

Id. at 48.
See U.S. ex rel. Emanuele v. Medicor Assocs., 242 F. Supp. 3d 409, 431
(W.D. Pa. 2017); see also United States v. Berkeley Heartlab, Inc., No. CV 9:14230-RMG, 2 (D.S.C. 2017) (holding that Anti-Kickback violations are per se
material because they are not a mere technical violation but a felony under fraud and
abuse and certainly the government’s knowledge of any violations would go to the
essence of the bargain with the violator).
122
Escobar II, 842 F.3d at 110.
123
242 F. Supp. 3d 4 at 431.
124
U.S. ex rel. Emanuele, 242 F. Supp. 3d 4 at 431.
125
226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
121

189

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

21

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

encouraged physicians to prescribe the drug for off-label uses while
knowing that these physicians would submit reimbursements for such
prescriptions to Medicare. 126 The court found that the Medicare Part
D, which determines which drugs Medicare reimbursements cover,
sets out more than just a technical requirement in the contract; it
included specific limitations on which drugs were available for
reimbursement by CMS making it an essential feature under the
company’s bargain with the government. 127 Therefore, the drug
company’s off-label campaign knowing physician prescriptions would
be submitted to Medicare for reimbursement was evidence to show the
campaign resulted in materially false misrepresentations to the
government under the FCA.128
In Smith v. Carolina Medical Center, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that merely because the government has the option
to refuse reimbursement based on a contractual violation, that option
alone is insufficient evidence to show the contractual obligation was
material.129 Instead, the standard is evidence that had the government
known of the violation it likely would have refused to pay the
reimbursements.130 In Smith, the relator alleged that an individual who
had been excluded from participating in Medicaid was involved in the
management of the clinics, a fact being concealed by the other clinic
leadership which rendered clinic billing statements to Medicaid
fraudulent under the FCA.131 The court found that a complaint, even at
the motion to dismiss stage, must allege the clinic did not violate just
any Medicare or Medicaid regulation, but one which would cause the
government to refuse to pay reimbursements. 132 The court found that
CMS regulations and administrative guidance from Health and Human
Services have made clear that when an individual or company that is
excluded from participation in Medicaid, yet continues to participate
126

Id. at 1036.
Id. at 1049.
128
Id. at 1050.
129
274 F. Supp. 3d 300, 314 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
130
Id. at 320.
131
Id. at 305.
132
Id. at 315.
127
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CMS will no longer pay reimbursements. 133 Because the individual
continued to participate in managing the clinic and the clinic
leadership concealed this fact, the court found this evidence of
material noncompliance with such an essential CMS regulation goes to
the essence of its bargain. 134
Each of these cases indicates something more than just a
technical violation of a contract, regulatory, or statutory obligation to
establish that the violation went to the essence of the bargain.
Situations involving the type of violations in these cases go to the
essence of the bargain because they not only grant the government an
option of refusing payment but also provide mechanisms for it to exact
hefty penalties. Thus, the government has made clear its policies and
positions on such violations and would certainly deny reimbursement
if it knew of them.
II. Technical Requirements Theory
Technical requirements are typically those portions of an
agreement that are business-related, administrative in nature, and do
not on their own rise to the level of materiality. 135 Allegations of fraud
based on breaches of contract are more likely to fit the description of
“government traps, zaps, and zingers that permits the government to
retain the benefit of a substantially conforming good or service but to
recover the price entirely—multiplied by three—because of some
immaterial contractual or regulatory non-compliance.”136
For example, the Eleventh Circuit held in Ruckh v. Salus
Rehabilitation that the relators FCA claim that a nursing facility’s
failure to maintain comprehensive care plans was not material to its
agreement with the government and was not Medicaid fraud.137 The
relator alleged that the facility’s omission to the government about its
133

Id. at 321.
Smith, 274 F.Supp.3d at 315.
135
Groden & Linneman, supra note 111 at 48.
136
Groden & Linneman, supra note 111 at 48 (citing United States v. Salus
Rehabilitation, LLC, 304 F.Supp.3d 1258, 1263 (M.D.Fla., 2018)).
137
Ruckh v. Salus Rehabilitation, LLC, 963 F.3d 1089, 1108 (11th Cir. 2020).
134
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failure to maintain the care plans was fraudulent because the plans
were labeled as conditions of payment under Medicaid regulations. 138
The court found the nursing facility’s failure to maintain the care plans
was not material because the relator failed to show any evidence
connecting the noncompliance with specific representations the
facility made to Medicaid.139 The court stated that the "FCA is not a
wide-ranging tool to combat failures to comply with even important
government regulations."140 The relator must connect the
noncompliance with specific representations that influenced the
government to reimburse when they otherwise would not. Violations
of regulatory conditions of payment alone do not prove materiality at
the pleading stage.141 The technical violation of a regulatory
requirement is not sufficient unless claimants show particular facts
that the violation influenced the government’s payment decision.
However, the Sixth Circuit held that some technical violations
can violate the FCA.142 In United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale
Senior Living Communities Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that a senior
living center’s failure to comply with the timing of the CMS physician
certification requirements—that the physicians did not gain
certification in the timely manner required under CMS regulations—
was enough to establish materiality. 143 The majority held that the
purpose of the CMS certification timeliness requirement is to prevent
fraudulent practices, a material matter that was a condition of the
contractual relationship with the government. 144 Failure to comply
with the certification timeliness was essentially failing to comply with
the certification process as a whole—because its main purpose was to
prevent fraudulent activities—was material to the government’s
decision to reimburse.145
138

Ruckh, 963 F.3d at 1104.
Id. at 1109.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
892 F.3d 822, 831 (6th Cir. 2018).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 834.
145
Id. at 835.
139
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Justice McKeague submitted a strong dissent to loosening the
materiality element by the majority, pointing out that the relator had
no evidence that failure to meet the CMS certification timeliness
requirement would have prevented the government from reimbursing
claims.146 Justice McKeague reiterated the Escobar holding that not all
undisclosed regulatory violations would rise to fraud and abuse. 147 The
majority’s holding, according to Justice McKeague, would result in a
slippery slope where any deviation from the regulatory strictures
would be deemed material despite the organization's lack of
knowledge that the noncompliance is material to the government. 148
These cases demonstrate courts’ differing interpretations of
what constitutes an omission of a technical violation that influenced
the government’s decision to reimburse payments. The factors that
Justice Thomas outlined in Escobar are not always consistent with one
another and often must be balanced against each other.149 For example,
the Third Circuit found that whether a regulation is an express
condition of payment is irrelevant when there is evidence the
government continued to pay similar claims despite its awareness of a
company’s failure to comply with the regulation.150 The Eleventh
Circuit found that even if a regulatory violation is a condition of
payment, that alone does not show materiality unless some facts show
that specific regulatory violation influenced the government’s payment
decision.151 Yet, the Sixth Circuit has taken the approach of treating
noncompliance with a regulation that is a condition of payment as a
primary factor in determining materiality, regardless of the impact the
specific omission had on the government’s decision to continue to
reimburse.152 Regardless of the different weight courts grant to more
technical violations, ultimately, the relators still bear the burden of
146

Id. at 838–39 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
Prather, 892 F.3d at 850 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
148
Id. at 841.
149
Groden & Linneman, supra note 111 at 48.
150
Farringer, supra note 25, at 1258 (citing to U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc.,
846 F.3d 325, 334 (9th Cir. 2017) and U.S. ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855
F.3d 481, 489 (3d Cir. 2017)).
151
Ruckh v. Salus Rehabilitation, LLC, 963 F.3d 1089, 1109 (11th Cir. 2020).
152
Prather, 892 F.3d at 841 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
147
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providing enough detail for courts to determine whether technical
noncompliance materially influences the government’s payment
decisions.
III. Government Payment History Theory
Following Escobar, courts look to the government's payment
history as a factor in determining whether the misrepresentations were
material to the agreement. 153 The Supreme Court in Escobar provided
that “if the Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full
despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and
has signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the
requirements are not material.”154 Yet, lower courts disagree on how
much weight this type of evidence should be given in FCA claims.
The First Circuit has generally ascribed to Escobar. The First
Circuit in D’Agostino v. ev3, Inc., found that the government’s
payment history and continuation of allowing the drug to remain on
the market was strong evidence showing immateriality.155 The relator
claimed the drug manufacturer made fraudulent misrepresentations to
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) which led to improper
reimbursements for such drugs by CMS.156 The court held that “the
FDA's failure actually to withdraw its approval of Onyx in the face of
D'Agostino's allegations precludes D'Agostino from resting his claims
on a contention that the FDA's approval was fraudulently obtained.”157
The First Circuit noted that even after the omissions to the FDA came
to light CMS continued to reimburse for the drug, and, per Escobar,
that was strong evidence that such omissions were technical and the
violations were not material to the government’s decision to
reimburse.158
153

Groden & Linneman, supra note 111, at 46.
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 176, 193-94 (2016).
155
D'Agostino v. ev3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2016).
156
Id. at 8.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 7.
154
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However, several lower courts have identified limitations on
using government payment history as evidence of materiality. For
example, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
found that general government payment history is not always strong
evidence of immateriality. 159 In Celgene, the court dismissed the
defendant’s argument that the government’s payment history was
enough evidence to show materiality because, while CMS continued to
reimburse payments after the case was brought by the relator, that did
not mean CMS had actual knowledge of any specific instances of
fraudulent billing.160 The court held the “fact that the FDA knew
generally about off-label [prescription drug] use does not mean CMS
knew about and agreed to reimburse particular off-label claims.”161
Another interpretation for how this type of evidence applies is
outlined in Smith, where the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania held that for government payment history to show
immateriality the government must have actual knowledge of the
fraudulent claims and paid the claims anyway. 162 The defendant
argued the government’s payment history showed immateriality
because when the clinic improperly billed for therapeutic services
completed by people who had not yet finished their master’s degrees,
the Pennsylvania healthcare administrator knew of the violations. 163
But the court found that because the defendants failed to allege that the
administrator paid the claims anyway, the evidence did not defeat the
relator’s motion to dismiss.164 Courts various interpretations for how
to evaluate government payment history to show immateriality
demonstrates the lack of consensus surrounding how much weight
should be placed on this type of evidence.

159

United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1050
(C.D. Cal. 2016).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Smith v. Carolina Med. Ctr., 274 F.Supp. 3d 300, 325 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
163
Id.
164
Id. at 324.
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Recently the government payment history theory of evidence
has been criticized by some members of Congress.165 In 2021,
Republican Senator Chuck Grassley introduced a bipartisan bill, S.
2428, which includes several amendments to the FCA, including the
following provision, “[i]n determining materiality, the decision of the
Government to forego a refund or pay a claim despite actual
knowledge of fraud or falsity shall not be considered dispositive if
other reasons exist for the decision of the Government with respect to
such refund or payment.”166 This provision essentially codifies the line
of cases that argue government payment history is not dispositive
evidence of materiality and limits the amount of weight such evidence
should be given in FCA cases. 167 The Senate Judiciary Committee
voted the bill out of committee in October 2021.168 Only time will tell
if the bill passes and how it might affect the future strength placed on
this type of evidence to defeat the FCA’s materiality element.
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES EX REL. PROSE V.
MOLINA HEALTHCARE OF ILLINOIS INC.
Regardless of the many ways in which district and circuit
courts differ in their applications of materiality evidence post-Escobar,
none of them have diverged so far from Escobar as the Seventh
Circuit when it declared that an MCO’s mere participation in the
healthcare industry is enough to establish materiality. In August 2021,
the Seventh Circuit decided United States ex rel. Prose, which
“conclude[d] that [the relator] plausibly allege[d] that as a
165

Senate Judiciary Committee Votes to Approve Amendments to the False
Claims Act. JD SUPRA. (Nov. 2, 2021) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/senatejudiciary-committee-votes-to-9912224/.
166
Christian D. Sheehan & Emily Reeder-Ricchetti, Senator Grassley
Overhauls Proposed FCA Amendments in Advance of Key Committee Vote Later this
Week, ARNOLD & PORTER (Oct. 27, 2021)
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/blogs/fca-quinotes/posts/2021/10/senator-grassley-overhauls-proposed-fca-amendments.
167
Id.
168
Senate Judiciary Committee Votes to Approve Amendments to the False
Claims Act, supra note 165.
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sophisticated player in the medical-services industry, Molina was
aware that these kinds of services [skilled nursing facility services]
play a material role in the delivery of Medicaid benefits.”169 The
Seventh Circuit’s final judgment was filed on August 19, 2021, and
Molina Healthcare of Illinois Inc., timely submitted a petition for
rehearing en banc on September 2, 2021. 170 As of November 15, 2021,
the Seventh Circuit denied rehearing the case en banc and made a few
small amendments to the final opinion. 171
A. Summary of the Case
This case was a qui tam action brought by relator Thomas
Prose against Molina Healthcare of Illinois—an MCO.172 Prose was
the founder of GenMed, a company that was subcontracted by Molina
to provide skilled nursing facility (“SNF”) services to Molina’s
beneficiaries.173 Molina contracted with the Illinois Department of
Healthcare and Family Services (“HFS”) to provide healthcare
services to Illinois Medicaid beneficiaries.174 Under the contract,
Molina was to provide SNF services for nursing facility enrollees. 175
After approximately a year of subcontracting with GenMed for these
services, the contract was dissolved in 2015 after price negotiations
broke down between GenMed and Molina.176 Prose then brought this
qui tam suit in 2017, alleging that Molina violated the FCA by failing
to provide SNF services as required under its contract with HFS. 177

169

U.S ex rel. Prose v. Molina Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 10 F.4th 765, 770 (7th
Cir. 2021)
170
See United States ex rel. Prose v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois, Inc., 2021
WL 5296454 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 2021).
171
Id. at 1 (amending two sentences of majority’s opinion and one sentence in
the dissent).
172
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 770.
173
Id. at 777.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 771.
176
Id. at 770–71.
177
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 769–71.
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Molina's contract with HFS was a typical risk contract wherein
Molina agreed to receive capitation payments from the government
determined by calculating a fixed amount per enrollee regardless of
whether the services exceeded the capitated amount. 178 The capitation
rates for enrollees were calculated based on which rate cell (risk pool)
they were assigned to according to their health status.179 There were
five rate cells—split into tiers—with the most expensive, highest tier
being enrollees living in a nursing facility. 180 The contract Molina
made with HFS specified which services must be provided to which
enrollees based on their assigned tier. 181
Those living in nursing facilities are entitled to Skilled Nursing
Facility, “SNF,” services.182 SNF services were defined in Molina’s
contract with the government as “intensive clinical management of
Enrollees in Nursing Facilities.”183 The contract goes on to list several
types of care covered under this umbrella term “SNF services.” 184
Personnel who deliver SNF services were termed “SNFists” and
defined in the contract as medical professionals “whose entire
professional focus is the general medical care of individuals residing
in a Nursing Facility and whose activities include Enrollee care
oversight, communication with families, significant others, [primarycare providers], and Nursing Facility administration.”185 Essentially,
SNFists refer to medical personnel meant to oversee other SNF
services available to beneficiaries enrolled in the highest tier. Here it
must be noted that the majority and dissent interpreted these terms in
the contract in two distinct ways. 186 The Majority concluded that all
SNF services are comprehensive so that the lack of any component of
the services outlined in the contract is enough to create an FCA
178

Id. at 769.
Id. at 771.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 771.
183
Id.
184
Id. at n.1.
185
Id. at 771.
186
Id.
179
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claim.187 The dissent argued that Prose’s allegations were limited to a
lack of “SNFist” services only and that other SNF services outlined in
the contract were still delivered by Molina which made this claim
nothing more than a breach of contract rather than fraud under the
FCA.188 Prose’s complaint alleged that because Molina failed to notify
the government of its inability to continue providing SNFist services
to beneficiaries and the omission was a material violation of its
contract with the government under the FCA. 189
I. Prose’s Allegations
Prose’s complaint included allegations of fraud under all three
FCA theories of liability: factual falsity, fraud in the inducement, and
implied false certification. 190 Prose’s allegation of factual falsity was
based on the enrollment forms that Molina submitted to the
government after its contract was dissolved with GenMed, which
showed Molina continued to enroll beneficiaries into the highest
tier.191 The highest tier included the option for SNFist services, which
Prose contended that Molina could not, nor intended to, provide to
those new enrollees.192 By enrolling any new members into that tier,
Prose concluded that Molina submitted factually false enrollment
forms to the government.193
Prose’s allegation of fraud in the inducement, or promissory fraud,
was that Molina continued to renew its contracts with the government
even after its subcontract with GenMed was dissolved.194 Prose
contended that Molina’s omission that it no longer contracted with
GenMed induced the government to believe Molina planned to

187

United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 771, n.1.
Id. at 779, n.2.
189
Id. at 773.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 774.
192
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 774.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 775.
188
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provide SNFist services and that the government would not have
renewed Molina’s contract had it known otherwise. 195
Finally, Prose alleged that Molina violated the FCA under the
implied false certification theory of liability when Molina failed to
inform the government that it no longer subcontracted with GenMed to
provide SNFist services.196 Because Molina still enrolled beneficiaries
into the highest tier which offered SNF services, Prose claimed its
omission was a material misrepresentation. 197
The dissent disagreed that the evidence Prose brought for both
fraudulent inducement and factual falsity was enough to meet the
requirements under Rule 9(b) pleading standards because the evidence
made general allegations that lacked particularity. 198 For this article’s
purpose, only a short discussion of Prose’s allegations under the first
two theories is included because the focus is primarily on the evidence
brought to show materiality under the implied false certification theory
of liability—i.e., whether Prose’s evidence is enough to prove
Molina’s omission was material to its agreement with the government.
II. Majority’s Opinion
Judge Wood wrote on behalf of herself and Judge Hamilton,
the majority.199 The majority held that submitting enrollment forms for
enrollees into the Nursing Facility rate cell was enough evidence of a
factually false statement under the FCA. 200 The majority agreed with
Prose, finding that by submitting enrollment forms for new enrollees
in the highest tier—that which includes SNFist services—Molina was
making an affirmatively false statement that it would provide all the
services available in that rate cell. 201

195

Id.
Id.
197
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 775–76.
198
Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
199
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 769.
200
Id. at 777.
201
Id.
196
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The majority held that Prose sufficiently pled his allegation of
fraudulent inducement.202 Prose’s evidence for fraudulent inducement
was the contention that when Molina renewed its contract with the
government in 2016 and 2017, it induced the government into
believing SNFist services were still being provided to beneficiaries in
the highest tier.203 The majority found this evidence convincing and
held that Prose met the pleading requirements under Rule 9(b)—that
the complaint must specify the “time, place, and content” of the
statement.204 Prose alleged that Molina never sought out new SNFists
which was enough to show it never intended to supply SNFist
services.205 Prose’s evidence that Molina never intended to provide
SNFist services in 2016 and 2017 was a statement made by Molina’s
Chief Operating Officer, that Molina’s “staff did not have the ability
or licensure to render SNF services.”206 The Majority found that
Molina knew they could not render SNFist services at the time of the
contract was renewed which satisfied the Rule 9(b) general intent
standard, despite Prose’s lack of evidence of whether Molina tried to
replace GenMed.207
III. Majority’s Interpretation of Implied False Certification
Both the majority and dissent agreed that Prose’s allegations
fell under the FCA’s implied false certification theory.208 The majority
recognized that “material omissions can suffice” as false
misrepresentations post-Escobar.209 Prose alleged that Molina’s
omission regarding its inability to provide SNFist services when
202

Id. at 775.
Id. at 777.
204
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 774.
205
Id. at 775.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 774.
208
Id. at 775, 779.
209
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 775 (holding “[i]mplied false
certification is just another genre of fraud, and so plaintiffs must as usually satisfy
Rule 9(b)'s requirements to plead falsity, materiality, and causation with
particularity”).
203
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renewing its contract with the government was a material
misrepresentation because by enrolling new beneficiaries into the
highest tier Molina falsely certified that those new enrollees would get
access to SNFist services. 210
The majority agreed with Prose that the price difference in
capitation rates for tiers demonstrated the importance of the services in
each tier to the government’s calculation of capitation rates.211 The
majority accepted Prose’s inference that SNF services—meaning all
services listed under this contract provision—account for the price
differential between tiers and that no new members should have been
enrolled into the third, highest, tier since Molina could not provide the
SNFist services. 212 Unlike the dissent, the majority did not think it
appropriate to differentiate between all SNF services and a subset of
SNF services that required SNFists oversight. 213 Molina argued that
Prose had no particular evidence to support this inference but was
merely speculating that the capitation rate calculations were heavily
influenced by the SNFist services despite that the rates be actuarially
sound and meet many other requirements. 214 The majority agreed with
Prose’s assumption that failure to provide SNFist services was a
material omission because Molina’s membership in the medical
services industry grants them the knowledge of how much importance
the government places on SNFist services when calculating capitation
rates.215
IV. Dissent’s Opinion
Chief Judge Sykes dissented. While the Seventh Circuit upheld
Prose’s allegations under all three theories of fraud—factual falsity,
fraudulent inducement, and implied false certification—Chief Judge
Sykes disagreed, finding that the only appropriate theory under which

210

Id. at 776.
Id. at 777.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 779–80 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
214
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 777.
215
Id.
211
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Prose’s allegations could be analyzed is implied false certification. 216
The dissent described how Prose’s allegations failed all three of the
FCA theories of liability under the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading
standard—that Prose must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud.217
The dissent found that Prose’s allegations of factual falsity
were not available based on the evidence provided in this case because
an express factual falsity is a direct or affirmative misrepresentation to
the government, not an omission. 218 However, the enrollment forms
submitted by Prose essentially required checking a box stating in
which tier a beneficiary would be placed—marking out which services
they are eligible for and may receive if needed. 219 Chief Judge Sykes
pointed out that SNFist services were only one of many SNF services
that enrollees are provided and eligible for in the highest tier, which
did not make the checked box on the form a factually false
representation to the government. 220
Prose argued that Molina fraudulently induced the government
to renew its contract by omitting that it could not provide SNFist
services, nor did it intend to provide SNFist services. 221 Chief Judge
Sykes pointed out that Prose could provide no particulars about such
fraudulent inducement other than that, generally, the contracts were
renewed.222 Chief Judge Sykes found that the statement by the Chief
Operating Officer did not imply that Molina never looked to replace
GenMed as its SNFist provider nor that it had no intention of replacing
GenMed, only that it could not supply those services by 2017.223 Thus,
Prose failed to provide evidence showing fraudulent inducement under
the Rule 9(b) pleading standard. 224
216

Id. at 779 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 780; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
218
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 780-82 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
219
Id. at 782 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
220
Id.
221
Id. at 781 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
222
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 781 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
223
Id.
224
Id.
217
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V. Dissent’s Interpretation of Implied False Certification
Chief Judge Sykes, in her dissent, found that an allegation of
implied false certification based only on beneficiary enrollment forms
does not meet the Escobar conditions.225 To satisfy the implied false
certification theory the relator must show, “first, the claim does not
merely request payment, but also makes specific representations about
the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant's failure to
disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirements makes those representations misleading halftruths.”226
Chief Judge Sykes found Prose failed the first prong of the
implied false certification theory under Escobar.227 She pointed out
that Molina’s enrollment forms enrolling beneficiaries into the highest
tier made no specific representations about the services other than
which services beneficiaries were eligible to receive. 228 Prose did not
allege that Molina put enrollees in the highest tier and then only
provides them services mapped out in a lower tier, but that it placed
enrollees in the proper tier for their health characteristics and then
provided all other benefits in that tier except the SNFist services. 229
Judge Sykes pointed out that Molina could properly bill for
services provided to beneficiaries in the highest tier which they
properly received that were not SNFist services.230 Prose had no
evidence to show that Molina billed the government for SNFist
services in particular when it was in fact not providing them to
beneficiaries.231 Judge Sykes disagreed with the majority’s opinion
that Molina’s position in the industry and knowledge of how capitation

225

Id. at 782 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added).
227
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 782–83 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
228
Id. at 783 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
226
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rates are calculated is enough to fill in the logical gaps in Prose’s
evidence.232
Prose also failed the second prong of Escobar’s implied false
certification theory because the enrollment forms did not contain any
“misleading half-truth[s].”233 Both the Escobar case and Judge Sykes
provide several examples of misleading omissions that rise to halftruths.234 In Escobar, the Court found that the reimbursement claims
for specific therapies improperly provided to patients, because they
were provided by unlicensed practitioners in violation of CMS
regulations, were misleading half-truths.235 CMS would naturally
assume the bills that were submitted to it for therapist services were
being provided by licensed therapists.236 Chief Judge Sykes provided
another apt example when she stated, “[i]magine that the Green Bay
Packers have a bye week and someone makes the statement, ‘the
Packers didn't win today.’ . . . The statement is true as far as it goes,
but it directly implies a specific falsehood to an unaware fan: that the
Packers lost that day.”237 However, the enrollment forms only asserted
that beneficiaries were eligible for services in the highest tier and that
is the package of services they were offered.238
B. Prose’s Compliant Failed to Allege Particular Facts to Show
Materiality
The enrollment forms alone failed to show with particularity
that newly enrolled beneficiaries were being denied the care they
required and were eligible to receive. 239 Judge Sykes argued that while
rate differentials could in some cases support an inference of a
misleading half-truth, to assert that it did here is an oversimplification.
232

Id. at 783–84 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 783 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
234
Id. at 783-84; see also Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex
rel. Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 190 (2016).
235
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 190.
236
Id.
237
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 783 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 784.
233
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Think of it this way: If rate cell 1 corresponds to 10
services provided at a rate of $2,000 and rate cell 2
corresponds to those same 10 services plus SNFist
services at a rate of $3,000, then billing at the level 2
rate while not providing SNFist services would support
an inference of materiality at the pleading stage. If
SNFist services are not delivered, then the contractor is
providing only level 1 services, and a reasonable person
would not pay much higher level 2 rates for receiving
only level 1 services. But now consider a scenario in
which rate cell 2 corresponds to 30 services—the 10 in
rate cell 1 plus 20 others, one of which is SNFist
services. In that scenario, it doesn't make sense to rely
on the $1,000 price differential in considering whether
the omission of SNFist services is material because the
differential may be largely explained by the 19 other
services separating rate cell 1 and rate cell 2.240
The latter example is more akin to what happened in this case.
SNFist’s care was only one in an entire host of SNF services that
enrollees in the tier may receive. 241 Chief Judge Sykes found that the
enrollment form evidence Prose presented required a logical
assumption that the only difference between the highest tier and lower
tiers was SNFist services.242 Yet, Prose did not establish with any
particularity why this assumption was correct. 243 Indeed, without
relying on this assumption, Prose provided no evidence to show the
lack of SNFist services was material to the government's decision to
reimburse Molina for beneficiaries' care in the highest tier. 244
The FCA defines the term material as “having a natural tendency
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of

240

Id. at 785 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
241
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money or property.”245 The Court in Escobar noted that “[u]nder any
understanding of the concept, materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the
likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged
misrepresentation.’”246 The Escobar opinion clarified how materiality
was to be applied under the implied false certification theory:
A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely
because the Government designates compliance with a
particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual
requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is it
sufficient for a finding of materiality that the
Government would have the option to decline to pay if
it knew of the defendant's noncompliance. 247
At most, Prose’s allegations, based on assumptions, showed that the
government would have the option to decline some specific
payments—which Prose failed to particularize—to Molina based on its
inability to supply SNFist services.248 That alone is not enough to meet
the materiality standard. 249
The majority’s agreement with Prose’s assumptions illuminates
its cavalier treatment of the complexities involved in calculating
capitation rates for healthcare beneficiaries. The majority here
assumed that the SNFist’s services account for the price differential
between rate cells—or at least a substantial amount of the
differential.250 As Chief Judge Sykes put it, “[a]lthough the contract
may have calibrated the capitation rates to the services the government
expected to be delivered, it doesn't follow that the government would
withhold payment if a single one of those services wasn't provided.”251
Prose presented no particular circumstances to show that the
245

31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4).
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 176,193 (2016) (quoting 26 R. Lord, Williston
on Contracts S 69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003)).
247
Id. at 194.
248
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 777 (citing to district court’s
holding).
249
See Escobar, 579 U.S. at 193.
250
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 785 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
251
Id.
246
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government considered the SNFist services to be material to the
agreement with Molina.
Chief Judge Sykes endorsed the district court’s finding that
materiality was not met because Prose’s allegations “at most supported
a conclusion that Molina’s actuarial consultants coordinated the
payment scheme with the government. Missing, [the court] thought,
was a contention that Molina was involved in calculating the
capitation rates.”252 Judge Sykes found that something more was
required to show materiality, such as evidence of how the capitation
rates were calculated or evidence that the SNFist services were a
primary difference between the middle and highest tiers as evidence
that his assumption is correct. 253
C. The Seventh Circuit Replaces Escobar’s Factors for Determining
Materiality with its Own
The majority did not follow any of the theories of evidence to
show materiality in its decision. The majority opinion at most made an
implied argument that the price differentiation between tiers must go
the essence of the bargain with the government because of the
significant differences in capitation rates. 254 Yet the majority did not
analyze the facts under any construction of this theory of evidence.
The facts in Prose are easily distinguished from cases such as in
Escobar II255, Emanuele256, and Celgene257, because Molina's
omission might not have undermined its ability to provide any
necessary services to its beneficiaries and might not have impacted
patients' quality of care. If Prose had alleged some facts of this perhaps
the materiality element would have been met under the essence of the
252

Id.
Id.
254
United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 771.
255
United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Services, Inc. (“Escobar
II”), 842 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2016).
256
U.S. ex rel. Emanuele v. Medicor Assocs., 242 F. Supp. 3d 409, 431 (W.D.
Pa. 2017).
257
United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1050
(C.D. Cal. 2016).
253
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bargain theory. Regardless, the majority did not even attempt this type
of analysis.258
The Seventh Circuit further departed from Escobar when it
dismissed the evidence Molina proffered that the government renewed
its contract and continued reimbursements even after Prose brought
these allegations.259 Instead, the Seventh Circuit stated “[i]t is true that
the government's continued payment of a claim despite ‘actual
knowledge’ that certain requirements are not met ‘is very strong
evidence that those requirements are not material.’ But this argument
is better saved for a later stage, once both sides have conducted
discovery.”260 This statement deviates from Escobar and many postEscobar cases which were also decided at the pleading stage. 261
Finally, the majority did not refer to the fact that this
contractual obligation is highly technical as it involves contractually
defined terms, which would weigh against the majority's holding in
Prose. The facts of this case are more like those in Ruckh, where the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the relators FCA claim at the pleading
stage because the only evidence of materiality was a vague assumption
reliant on generalities which failed to link any specific representations
to the technical non-compliance of a regulatory violation. 262 Similarly,
this case is distinguishable from the Sixth Circuit case Prather, which
found that an omission of noncompliance was material because the
regulation itself, while technical, served the specific purpose of
preventing fraud and abuse.263 Here, the crux of Prose’s evidence was
based on a vague assumption, without particulars, and the majority
rests its decision on the presumed sophistication of an MCO.264 The
258

United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 770–779.
Id. at 777.
260
Id. (quoting Escobar, 579 U.S. at 195).
261
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. and Mass., ex rel. Julio Escobar and
Carmen Correa, (Escobar), 579 U.S. 176, 195 (2016); see also Ruckh v. Salus
Rehabilitation, 963 F.3d 1089, 1104 (11th Cir. 2020).; United States ex rel. Prather
v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 892 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2018);
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majority’s holding disregarded the caution in Escobar that not any
violation of a contractual, regulatory, or statutory violation should be
material because of the enormous amount of regulatory and statutory
obligations demanding MCO compliance. 265 As Justice Thomas noted,
“facing [FCA] liability for violating any of them would hardly help
would-be defendants anticipate and prioritize compliance
obligations."266 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit’s holding rendered the
materiality element toothless because it negates the particularity
standards required for FCA claims at the pleading stage and ignores
the complexity of issues with which MCOs must grapple.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION BODES ILL FOR MANAGED CARE
ORGANIZATIONS FACING FUTURE FALSE CLAIMS LITIGATION
The Seventh Circuit disregarded the existing theories of
evidence and allows relators to skirt their burden of materiality by the
mere assertion that an MCO is a highly sophisticated member of the
healthcare industry. The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of what
constitutes sufficient evidence of materiality at the pleading stage
places an enormous burden on MCOs because it does not define what
makes an MCO a “highly sophisticated” 267 member of the medical
services industry. All MCOs will be hard-pressed to show they do not
fall under this broad category.
The Seventh Circuit’s expectation that MCOs know which
single contractual violation would rise to the level of a material
omission is untenable. As Chief Judge Sykes correctly put it, “the
majority's conclusion that Prose has stated a claim for implied false
certification essentially establishes a new rule that any claim for
payment while in material noncompliance with a contract or governing
law is an actionable violation of the FCA.”268 Courts should be more
cautious when making such sweeping assumptions about what MCOs
and other healthcare organizations should know is material to the
265

Escobar, 579 U.S. at 192.
Id.
267
See United States ex rel. Prose, 10 F.4th at 777.
268
Id. at 786 (Sykes, C.J., dissenting).
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government when the issue is based on noncompliance with a
contractual obligation. Moving forward courts should scrutinize the
Seventh Circuit’s definition of sufficient materiality evidence closely
and consider what evidence relators should be required to show.
Future FCA litigants should refocus attention on the factors
enumerated in Escobar and the evidential theories espoused by lower
courts.269
Admittedly, it is difficult to show with particularity that
omissions rise to the level of material violations under the implied
false certification standard. But the facts in Escobar and many postEscobar cases demonstrate that it is not impossible to meet this
materiality standard, even at the pleading stage. The Rule 9(b)
heightened standard to show materiality with particularity at the
pleading stage is still critical to such cases. 270 The heightened pleading
standard exists precisely to prevent litigious hungry relators from
pursuing breach of contract claims under the guise of fraud and abuse
so that they might increase their potential damages.
CONCLUSION
MCOs are subject to thousands of pages of regulatory and
statutory standards, not to mention those contractual negotiations
established in agreements with the government. If all that is necessary
for relators to establish an FCA claim at the pleading stage is
speculation that any noncompliance is material to the government’s
reimbursement decision, that shifts the burden on the MCO to show
otherwise, which is not the Rule 9(b) standard. 271 While not all
evidence is equal in establishing materiality under the FCA, courts
should at least attempt to balance the factors enumerated in Escobar
and post-Escobar case law, rather than delaying such scrutiny until
269

See Groden & Linneman, supra note 111 at 48.
See Prather, 838 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding the Rule 9(b)
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271
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after discovery as the Seventh Circuit suggested in Prose.272 Such
delays will hamper judicial efficiency and increase frivolous litigation
attempts to use the FCA for contractual enforcement, detracting from
its true purpose of combating fraud and abuse. MCOs will have
trouble quashing such frivolous claims at the pleading stage if all
relators must establish is an MCOs membership in the medical
services industry.

272
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